This paper comments on a theoretically based index of protection recently developed by Anderson and Neary. The index must be calculated within the context of a specific CGE model; Anderson and Neary propose a generic model, and have found that the index is robust to changes in the elasticities embedded within that model. Is the index also robust to changes in the specification of the model? The paper identifies one historical instance where the index is extremely sensitive to the specification of the model's demand side. There are important methodological lessons to be learnt from this example. © 1997 Elsevier Science B.V.
of tariffs and quotas actually in place 2. Unlike previous ad hoc measures, the TRI makes theoretical sense. However, by definition the TRI can only be measured within the context of a particular general equilibrium model. The question thus arises: how sensitive is the TRI to the specification of that model?
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the TRI, as well as the generic CGE model proposed by Anderson and Neary within which to evaluate it. Section 3 presents a specific historical debate: was 19th century France really more protectionist than Britain? The answer depends on how you measure average protection. In particular, the qualitative literature has pin-pointed the structure of demand as being crucial to the debate. Section 4 calculates the TRI for 19th century Britain and France within the context of the generic Anderson-Neary model, but alters the specification of the model's demand side. The TRI is shown to be extremely sensitive to the specification of the CGE model. Section 5 concludes.
The trade restrictiveness index and a generic model
In a series of papers, Anderson and Neary (1992, 1994a,b) have proposed the most promising measure yet of a country's protection, based on solid analytical foundations: the trade restrictiveness index (TRI), To motivate the TRI, consider the standard partial equilibrium analysis of the effects of a tariff in a small open economy (Fig. 1) . The quota equivalent to a tariff t is AB; i.e. it is the quota which produces the same static welfare loss (the shaded triangles) as the tariff. It makes sense to similarly define an index of protection for more general cases. A country's TRI is the uniform tariff which would have the same static welfare effect as the structure of tariffs and quotas actually in place. It is a weighted average tariff, but the weights are marginal welfare weights, rather than trade shares.
It follows from the definition of the TRI that its level depends not only on the structure of protection, but also on the structure of the economy in question, which in practice boils down to the structure of the computable general equilibrium (CGE) model used to evaluate it. Ideally, we would like to know what the 'true' model was for each country and time period. Since arriving at the true model is impossible, the danger arises that the value of the index for a particular country might be a consequence of some quirk of the country-specific model. How comparable would such indices be across periods and countries? It seems sensible to use a 'standard' model when calculating the index for different countries. Q Moreover, such a cross-country model should be very disaggregated, at least as far as the treatment of imports is concerned.
To operationalise their index in data scarce environments, Anderson and Neary propose a particularly simple and parsimonious CGE model with which to evaluate the TRI (see Fig. 2 ). The model can treat imports in as disaggregated a manner as is desired; while the supply side of the model is extremely aggregated, facilitating calibration. Anderson and Neary also provide an EXCEL spreadsheet program enabling researchers to easily implement the model. The economy produces two goods, a non-traded good (NT) and an export good (EX). Production uses two types of inputs: a non-traded input, i.e. domestic factors of production, and imported intermediate inputs (II) . The production function is CES on the input side, and CET (constant elasticity of transformation) on the output side. Anderson and Neary typically take as benchmark values 0.7 for the elasticity of substitution (s), and 5.0 for the elasticity of transformation (t).
The consumer is endowed with the non-traded input, and receives all tariff revenue. The consumer is also endowed with enough foreign exchange to enable him to run the (exogenous) trade deficit. He consumes the non-traded good, as well as imported final goods (IF). The entire production of the non-traded good is consumed by the consumer; the entire production of the export good is exported. The model thus assumes implicitly that imported goods and exported goods both differ from domestic commodities consumed locally. The utility function is CES, with the benchmark elasticity of substitution being taken as 5.0.
The advantage of this specification is that the model can be calibrated with only three numbers (in addition to the import and trade policy data you obviously need): GDP, the value of exports, and the trade balance. Calibration proceeds as indicated in Table 1 . Note that the consumer receives the tariff revenue on both intermediate and final goods, and that the cost to the consumer of final goods includes the tariffs levied thereon. Therefore the consumer's budget constraint is satisfied.
Some complications arise in the presence of quotas. First, the welfare effects of a quota depend on who gets the rents; and thus the TRI also depends on who gets the rents. In the spreadsheet version of their model, Anderson and Neary make the 'convenient assumption' that all rents are dissipated through competitive rent-seeking; but other assumptions could be made.
Second, the presence of quotas leads to data problems. In the case of an ad valorem tariff, we observe domestic prices and quantities, and can infer the world price. Thus, given the slope of the demand and supply curves, we can calculate the welfare loss associated with the tariff, and consequently the TRI. However, in the case of a quota, while we observe domestic prices and quantities, we only know the world price if we also know the quota premium --which is typically not the case. It is thus impossible to calculate the welfare loss associated with a quota, and by implication, it is impossible to calculate the level of the TRI. However, it is possible to calculate the change in welfare associated with a change in quotas; it is thus possible to calculate changes in the TRI. The spreadsheet program provided by Anderson and Neary does precisely this; it allows you to track how the TRI of an economy is changing over time. (Of course, if one of the periods being compared is a hypothetical free-trade period, and data on world prices of quotaconstrained goods are available, then the program can be used to calculate the level of the TRI in a given period.)
At this point, the reader will have two questions. Does it matter whether you use the TRI or not? Is the index trustworthy?
In answer to the first question, Anderson and Neary have computed the TRI for a number of cases, and find that indeed its behaviour differs dramatically from that of the trade-weighted average tariff equivalent. Table 2 , taken from Anderson and Neary (1994a) , gives changes in the US protective stance visa vis Hong Kong textiles: the complete lack of correlation between changes in the TR/and changes in the standard index is typical of their findings to date. Clearly, standard measures such as weighted average tariffs could give an extremely misleading impression of what is happening to a country's trade policy.
This paper focuses on the second question: is the TRI trustworthy? The index itself makes theoretical sense, of course, so the question really is: how sensitive is the index to the specification of the CGE model which is used to calculate it? How sensitive is it to the elasticities of substitution and transformation embedded in the model? If changing these elasticities, or the specification of the model, changed the level of the index significantly, we would still have an index number problem, albeit of a more fundamental, 'economic' nature. In such a case the index number problem would reflect the modeller's ignorance about the true structure of a particular economy. Source: Anderson and Neary (1994a) , Table 4 .
Anderson and Neary recognize that whether the TRI is robust to changes in elasticity values is an important issue. The evidence to date is that the TRI is not sensitive to changes in elasticities: Table 3 gives some illustrative calculations for Colombia. They note that the robustness found in the Colombian case has also been found in the other TRI applications that have been carded out to date; but go on to state that "Because it is only an empirical finding, of course, it needs to be replicated extensively on other data sets before it can be regarded as typical" (Anderson and Neary (1994a), p. 166) .
Is this finding generally true? An historical example suggests otherwise.
France and the UK: 19th century fortresses or free-traders?
In a strongly revisionist 1991 article, Nye (1991) challenged the conventional view that Britain was the free trader of 19th century Europe, while France was relatively protectionist. Nye based his argument on trade-weighted average tariffs for the two countries, as well as the evidence on individual tariff levels contained in Tables 4 and 5 : he found that British average tariffs were higher than their French counterparts until the late 1870s. Nye concluded that the mistaken impression that Britain was the leading free trader of the period, especially when compared with its nearest neighbour, is due to the fact that historians have tended to have too narrow a focus, obsessing about a small number of 'leading sectors' such as cotton textiles, rather than the economy as a whole 3.
Nye's article was in many respects deeply shocking, challenging as it did one of economic history's most established stories (or morality tales): Britain's conversion to free trade in 1846, and the huge growth in overseas trade and investment which followed. It was therefore not surprising when Irwin (1993) responded to Nye. Irwin questioned the usefulness of trade-weighted average tariffs: after 1846, summary statistics in Tables 6 and 7. Tables 6 and 7 , based on the information in Tables 4 and 5 , give trade-weighted average tariffs for three classes of commodities: 'exotic goods', 'wines', and other goods. Exotic goods are imported goods with no domestic substitutes: sugar and coffee in France, sugar, coffee, tea and tobacco in Britain. Wines, consisting of wine, rum and brandy, are a separate category for Britain, for reasons which will become apparent. Tables 6 and 7 show that in the 1840s and 1850s, British tariffs on exotic goods were higher than their French counterparts. British tariffs on 'other' goods were higher than in France in 1841, but lower in 1854, and virtually non-existent in 1881. Britain levied high tariffs on wine and spirits throughout the period.
The result of high tariffs on exotic goods and wines was British average tariffs which were higher than in France: this is essentially Nye's point. However, Irwin argued that the duties on exotic goods and wines were not protective, as there were no domestic substitutes for these goods. Nye had argued that wine and beer were substitutes; Irwin replied that tariffs on wine were simply the equivalent of excise taxes on domestic beer, and that they therefore had no protective effect. The Nye-Irwin debate, which was largely qualitative, thus hinged on the specification of demand, and in particular on how exotic goods should be treated. It was these goods which faced the highest tariffs, with the British tariffs on exotic imports, in particular tobacco, being far higher than in France. Moreover, several of these tariffs increased in Britain over the period, in contrast to the general pattern of tariff reductions.
It seems natural to try to resolve this debate using the TRI. In particular, it makes sense to calculate the TRI for both countries, using the generic AndersonNeary CGE model. However, given the nature of the Nye-Irwin debate, it will be necessary to see if the TRI is sensitive to the specification of the model's demand side.
The TIlI and model specification: sensitivity analysis
The TRI is a measure of the overall distortion implicit in a country's trade regime. Intuitively, this should imply that a country with a more widely dispersed tariff structure will have a higher TR/, ceteris paribus (since a greater dispersion of tariffs implies greater discrimination between commodities). Anderson (1995) shows that this is not generally the case; the TRI is rather a function of the 'marginal trade-weighted generalized variance' of the tariff schedule. Nonetheless, the intuition persists that the British TRI level will be extremely high indeed, if all imported goods are treated symmetrically. The generic Anderson-Neary model of Fig. 2 does precisely this. However, it seems unreasonable to assume that the domestic elasticity of substitution between tea and domestic products should be as high as that between, say, American grain and domestic products. What if different categories of imports are treated asymmetrically?
For example, Irwin might argue that the model should distinguish between exotic and other goods, letting the latter substitute with domestic goods, but not the former. This structure might be represented by Fig. 3, indicating a two-level utility function. At the top level, exotic goods enter in fixed proportions with all other goods (the elasticity of substitution between the two groups is set to zero). At the second level, other imports substitute with the domestic good in the normal fashion. Table 6 gives calculated values for the French TRI, assuming that quota premia on textiles were either 30% or 50% (the range indicated by Nye as being reasonable) 4. The TRI is calculated using MPSGE/GAMS. First the benchmark equilibrium is reproduced; a counterfactual experiment then abolishes all existing s=0 Exotic //¢~=5.0
Other NT Imports tariffs and quotas, and imposes a uniform, endogenous, tariff, whose level is determined by the requirement that welfare be equal to benchmark welfare.
The French model makes one further sensible assumption (Fig. 4) : colonial and foreign sugar are assumed to substitute very closely with each other (the elasticity of substitution is taken to be 10). As can be seen, the assumption made about quota rents matters very little. Based on the data given in Nye, it appears that French protection was equivalent to a uniform tariff of 17.7% in 1837-1846, 11.5% in 1847-1856, 4.7% in 1857-1866, and 5.5% in 1867-1876. The TRI is then calculated for the UK, using the same model framework as indicated in Fig. 3 (colonial and foreign sugar not being distinguished in the tariff statistics for Britain). The obvious problem, which clearly relates to the exchanges between Irwin and Nye, is whether or not to include wine, rum and brandy with the other exotic goods. Table 7 indicates, not surprisingly, that it matters hugely whether or not you do. It appears that if wine, rum and brandy are taken to have no domestic substitutes (case (1)), Irwin is right: the British TRI is lower than its French counterpart. This is even true for 1841, the period just prior to Repeal, when, as Tables 6 and 7 indicate, trade-weighted average tariffs on broad categories of products were all higher in Britain than in France. This illustrates the importance of the classic index number problem, which the TRI was devised to solve.
However, if wine, rum and brandy are not treated as exotic, but are assumed to be as substitutable with British goods as imported wheat or timber, then Nye is spectacularly right. Indeed, in this case ( (2)) the British TRI reaches absurdly high levels, reflecting for example a tariff of 510% on rum in 1881.
The treatment of imported alcoholic beverages thus emerges as crucial when calculating the British TRI. Neither of the extremes considered up to now (they did not substitute at all with British domestic goods; they were like any other import) may seem satisfactory. tier, wines substitute with other goods in a CES fashion. At the third level, other imports substitute with the non-traded good, with an elasticity of 5. This formulation focuses on the elasticity of substitution between wines and other goods (domestic and imported). The question of how substitutable wine and beer were can thus be addressed in this framework. Irwin's argument that domestic excise duties on beer meant that the wine tariff was not protective cannot, however, be addressed; to do that we would need to break out beer from the rest of domestic production, and model indirect taxes on that sector. In the present framework, the distinction between protective and revenue tariffs boils down simply to a question of demand elasticities. Table 8 calculates the British TRI for the three years, in each case letting the elasticity of substitution between wines and other goods vary between 0 and 1.5. As expected, the TRI is extremely sensitive to this elasticity, with the 1841 index varying from 15.2% to 38.9%, and the 1881 index varying from 0.6% to 21.2%. In this framework, Britain is the relatively more liberal nation for low elasticities s, and France is the free trader otherwise.
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Conclusions
The Anderson-Neary TRI represents the best option researchers have of correctly measuring protection. Moreover, since it is theoretically based, and since it can only be calculated within the context of particular trade models, the TRI forces users to think more deeply about what really constitutes protection than some other measures currently available. The generic Anderson-Neary CGE model used to calculate the TRI is ingenious, in that it provides a uniform framework within which to evaluate the TR/across countries, is easy to calibrate, and can handle a very disaggregated treatment of imports. The fact that the TRI has proved robust to changes in the elasticities embedded in this model, when applied to modem data, seems reassuring.
However, experience with CGE modelling suggests that CGE results are typically far more sensitive to changes in model specification than to changes in elasticities. Changing the supply side of the generic model might in certain cases make theoretical sense, but there are formidable data obstacles to doing so. The demand side of the generic model can however be easily re-specified; unfortunately, this paper has identified one instance where the TRI was absurdly sensitive to changes in both the model specification and demand elasticities. Of course, a historian might not like any of the demand specifications I have used, but that is not the point: rather, the point is that the specification used has a profound impact on the level of the TRI. The initial aim of the exercise was to resolve an essentially qualitative debate by applying new technology to old data: this has proved impossible (which in retrospect should have been predictable). The TRI is capable of making the terms of this debate more precise, but not of resolving the debate.
The TRI continues to be a sensible index of protection. Nevertheless, there are important methodological lessons arising from this exercise. First, since model specification apparently matters, it seems logical that if a researcher is only interested in calculating the change in protection in one particular country, and has a good CGE model of that economy to hand, incorporating a suitably disaggregated treatment of imports, then that model should be used to calculate the TRI. Second, if cross-country comparisons are being made, and a generic model is needed, the Anderson-Neary model should be used with some caution. In particular, researchers need to think carefully about the structure of demand when calculating the index for a particular country, rather than blindly reaching for any particular off-the-shelf model. Third, it is worthwhile considering why the TRI was so sensitive to model specification in this case. First, the British tariff structure was extremely dispersed: very low or zero tariffs on many commodities, tariffs of several hundred percent on others. Second, commodities with no obvious domestic substitutes, such as tea, coffee and tobacco, accounted for a significant fraction of British imports. Third, there was a close correspondence between tariff levels, on the one hand, and the nature of the product on the other, with the highly tariffed commodities being those which (arguably) had no good domestic substitutes. If any of these three conditions had not obtained, the British TRI would not have been so sensitive to model specification. If all imports were clearly equally substitutable with domestic goods, Irwin's case would not stand up. If 'exotic' imports, or 'wines', had not faced such high tariffs compared with other imports, Nye would not have a case, and the index would also have been more robust.
It should be stressed that this exercise was carried out in the context of 19th century Europe: the issues it raises may not be as important in the 20th century, at least insofar as rich countries are concerned. Exotic commodities with no domestic substitutes, such as tea and coffee, are not as prominent in world trade as they were then; inter-industry trade between countries is more important; and there is considerably less variation in the inter-industry structure of protection than in the British case just described. For small developing countries, on the other hand, which are highly specialised in production, and which may tax 'luxury' imports heavily, the cautionary tale just presented may be of greater relevance.
